Saturday, 18 October 2014
Βιντεοσκοπημένη παρέμβαση του καθηγητή Γ. Τσεμπελή, Πανεπιστήμιο του Michigan, για τη συνταγματική αναθεώρηση
Friday, 17 October 2014
The edifice of the European Union (EU) has been built on the basis of equilibrium between intergovernmental co-operation and supranationalism. In other words, the fathers of Europe wanted to attain integration through the institution of organs which would be representative of the two currents: institutions with an intergovernmental character, through which the voice of the Member-States could be heard, and institutions with a supranational character, which would represent Europe, as a potentially integrated entity, with its own interests and expectations. In the first category, the central institution is the Council of Ministers, which functions with the presence of national Ministers, depending on the subject-matter of the agenda, while in the second category the main organs are the Commission and the European Parliament. The Courts, finally, settle disputes in a spirit of supranationalism, and in this direction they have offered their good offices to integration.
Monday, 22 September 2014
Friday, 19 September 2014
Wednesday, 17 September 2014
Many of the world’s developed economies have introduced, or are planning to introduce, bank bail-in regimes. Both the planned EU resolution regime and the European Stability Mechanism Treaty involve the participation of bank creditors in bearing the costs of bank recapitalization via the bail-in process as one of the (main) mechanisms for restoring a failing bank to health. There is a long list of actual or hypothetical advantages attached to bail-in centred bank recapitalizations. Most importantly the bail-in tool involves replacing the implicit public guarantee, on which fractional reserve banking has operated, with a system of private penalties. The bail-in tool may, indeed, be much superior in the case of idiosyncratic failure. Nonetheless, there is need for a closer examination of the bail-in process, if it is to become a successful substitute to the unpopular bailout approach. This paper discusses some of its key potential shortcomings. It explains why bail-in regimes will fail to eradicate the need for an injection of public funds where there is a threat of systemic collapse, because a number of banks have simultaneously entered into difficulties, or in the event of the failure of a large complex cross-border bank, except in those cases where failure was clearly idiosyncratic.